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Resumen 
La evolución de la lengua humana probable-
mente pasó por distintos períodos decisivos o 
barreras. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que tie-
nen la forma de una cascada de bifurcaciones, o 
elecciones binarias. En cada paso, constela-
ciones de pequeñas causas decidieron del 
camino a seguir. Esto explica la improbabilitad 
de un fenómeno como el lenguaje humano en 
el reino animal (lo cual ha sido el principal 
argumento de los creacionistas cristianos). La 
jerarquía y la sucesión de las “decisiones” (de-
pendientes de los principios de la evolución de 
Darwin) nos proporcionan una serie de indi-
cios sobre la arquitectura del lenguaje humano, 
en concreto la aparición de la valencia verbal 
(estructura argumental, construcciones), la po-
laridad entre el sujeto y el predicado de la frase 
y otros rasgos sintácticos pueden ser explicados 
como resultado de estas etapas de la evolución. 
Asumimos, por último, que la evolución de 
esquemas básicos de acción (acción manual), 
como el esquema de EMPUÑAR) tuvieron una 
importancia fundamental para el desarollo 
conceptual del lenguaje humano. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: evolución, bifurcación 
binaria, valencia verbal, esq*uema de acción. 
 
Abstract 
The evolution of human language probably 
passed several gateways or decisive periods. 
Our aim is to show that they have the form of 
a cascade of bifurcations, i.e. of binary choices. 
At each step small causal constellations may 
have decided on which way to go. This ex-
plains the overall improbability of a phe-
nomenon like human language in the animal 
kingdom (which was and is the major argu-
ment of creationists). The hierarchy and tem-
poral sequence of “decisions” (Darwinian 
principles were the deciders) gives us a hint at 
the architecture of human language. In par-
ticular the emergence of verbal valence (ar-
gument structure, constructions), of subject-
predicate constellations and syntactic devices 
can be explained as a result of these evolution-
ary steps. We presume that throughout the 
evolution basic schemata of (manual) action, 
like the GRASP-schema were of central im-
portance for the conceptual unfolding of 
human language. 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: evolution, bifurcation bi-
nary, verbal valence, verbal scheme 
                                                             
*
 This is an elaborated and augmented versiono f a lecture given in Alicante. I thank Prof. Cifuentes 
Honrubia for his invitation. 
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1. Introduction 
The most astonishing feature of human language and human civilization is that they 
seem to be (or really are) so dramatically different from anything else in the animal 
kingdom. Humans are either monsters (or aliens) in relation to other living beings1 or 
they are gods (or at least simulacra of God: this is the classical Christian picture which 
dominated the history of the question until the 18th century). In the perspective of post-
Darwinian biology this view is an illusion; everything in the universe, including humans 
is subjected to general laws of nature and the universal principles of Darwinian evolu-
tionary biology are called mutation (later elaborated in genetics and molecular biology) 
and selection (at different levels from the molecule to societies). Genetic drift in small 
populations and morphogenetic fields may complement these fundamental principles. 
The question arose: What singular event or series of singular events was able to give 
human evolution a direction and an itinerary which separated it from the predominant 
success stories in the animal kingdom? How can we explain the huge behavioral diffe-
rences between a group of chimpanzees in the West African rain forest and the urban 
societies in some cosmopolite town like New York, Tokyo or Paris? 
The line pursued in this article is to postulate a cascade of singularities and decisive 
moves/changes/catastrophes2 which were responsible for the dramatic difference bet-
ween the evolutionary itinerary of humans and other hominids (or mammals). 
2. The origin of “Homo loquens”: some hypotheses 
Scientific research in the last decennia has contributed many facts on the origin of 
man as “Homos loquens”, which make it possible to answer the question: Are there 
sudden transitions, which created frontier-lines between species which talk, build arte-
                                                             
1 A short version of the original lecture in Alicante 2003 has been published in Catalan with the unau-
thorized prefix ¨Hopefully it is a tale about monsters” (“Una esperançola historia de monstres? cf. 
Wildgen, 2003). Probably Prof. Garcia Lopez who had invited the contribution took the sympathetic 
view of our co-hominids who may see humans as monsters of intelligence and technological skill. 
2 In the original meaning in Greek the verb: καταστρέφειν (katastréphein) means to overturn, to turn 
around, to reverse. Catastrophe theory is linked to the work of the mathematicians René Thom and 
Christopher Zeeman and applies the classification theorem in singularity theory, which gives a list of 
elementary catastrophes. Applications to linguistics were elaborated in Wildgen (1981, 1982 and 
1994). Later work on “semiophysics” is commented in the volumes edited by: Wildgen and Brandt 
(2010) and Wildgen and Plümacher (2009: in German). 
WOLFGANG WILDGEN 361 
 
facts, produce art, live in complex societies and those who don’t? The transition to or-
ganic language capacity concerns: 
(a) the speech producing organs (control of pulmonary pressure, vocal cords, shape 
of the larynx, shape of the mouth, lips, teeth); 
(b) the auditory system (mainly the inner ear, the cochlea, and the neighboring 
sense of equilibrium); 
(c) the brain (mainly the cortex but also the brain stem) with their capacities of ad-
vanced perception (categorization), memory, and self-monitoring (cf. the 
frontal lobes) which seem to distinguish Homo sapiens from Homo 
neanderthalensis and last not least, the language centers (Broca and Wernicke-
centers). 
Dramatic changes in the geometry of the crane, the position of the larynx, the ge-
ometry of the inner ear, the absolute and relative volume of the brain (neo-cortex) took 
place, but these evolutions were so slow, the magnitudes (e.g., of brain volume) so over-
lapping between species, that a catastrophe like the sudden “creation” of language, of 
artefacts and art seems impossible. All these continuous changes just contributed to a 
predisposition for language (cf. Wildgen, 2004: chap. 2). This continuity corresponds to 
basic principles of Darwinian evolution that rest on the continuous effect of selective 
features in the environment (selection) and minimal chance deviations in the genetic 
equipment (mutation). The dramatic behavioral and “cultural” differences between 
higher primates (e.g., chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans) and humans ask 
for other mechanisms explaining rather sudden changes (this means many millennia 
instead of millions of years). A sudden shift (catastrophe) in a continuum may be 
caused if a line of equilibrium is crossed (e.g., the model of a balance).3 This phenome-
non is called symmetry breaking. Symmetry presupposes at least bimodality, i.e., two 
modes coexist and there is a path of smooth transition between both in a base space. 
                                                             
3 Other catastrophes involve the creation/destruction of an attractor, the appearance of bimodality, 
trimodality, etc.; cf. Wildgen, 1982, 1994, for a description of catastrophe theory and its application to 
linguistics. 
362  LANGUAGE EVOLUTION AS A CASCADE OF BEHAVIORIAL BIFURCATIONS 
 
 
Figure 1: Catastrophic transition between two attractors (Green vs. Blue) given a smooth surface.  
In the empirical application the first step has to consider the existence (or emergen-
ce) of the alternatives, i.e. in the above case the two sheets of attractors (stable states) in 
a continuum (see the unbroken surface in the background; the whole sheet is without 
limits, only the environment of the instability point is shown in Figue 1). This bifurca-
tion may happen because under different circumstances two types of behavior came up, 
were in concurrence and finally entered a zone of conflict where one alternative could 
be chosen  (alternatively a situation of ambiguity could exist). The first step concerns 
the circumstances of change (choice). In human evolution (probably up to now) these 
choices are not made deliberately by an agent or a group of agents; external forces of 
nature or internal factors of coherence “decide”. In the evolution of man quick climatic 
changes (in Africa and in other regions of the world) have driven secondary changes in 
the fauna and flora, they have separated subpopulations for long periods (in East Africa, 
the cradle of humans, huge lakes with large islands and rivers through the rift valley 
grew and disappeared again), have driven them to small areas of escape (quasi in a se-
ries of quasi-deluve scenarios, followed by extreme drought), where they shrinked un-
der extreme conditions of selection. Thus in the critical period before the appearance of 
Homo sapiens only a small remaining population was able to survive (e.g. in caves on 
the shore of the Indian Ocean in Southern Africa; cf. Marean, 2010); before the Homo 
neanderthalensis died out, this species was driven to the shores of Spain and Italy seve-
ral times. When Homo sapiens lived in Europe (ca. after 40.000 BP), he suffered under 
the same conditions, but he was able to survive and to expand again after the end of the 
last ice-age (ca. 12.000 y BP). The driving mechanism is therefore one of rather quick 
and dramatic climatic changes. The complex effects on fauna and flora (nutrition and 
housing) and possibly the enforced mixture with refugees of different provenience in 
the remaining places triggered the transition which was accompanied by a dramatic 
reduction of the population (small population enable a genetic drift and allow for quick-
er changes). In a formal sense one may consider these ecological variations as a heating 
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up of the process which allowed the transition to new states in the behavioral dynamic 
system. As soon as the situation cooled down, the new state was stabilized and became 
the basis of a growing population.4 This probably happened again and again, whereby 
humanity (or at least regional groups) were driven towards extinction. Cf. for different 
scenarios for the evolution of human language Wildgen (2004: chapter 2) and Wildgen 
(2010b). I will in the following consider the single bifurcations one after the other. 
2.1. Towards a dominance of the phonic channel 
In higher apes (e.g., chimpanzees) one finds two means of social communication 
without instrumental or referential functions: grooming  (lousing, caring for one  ano-
ther) and social calls. The (manual) mode of grooming dominates and it consumes 
about 20% of the time budget. The critical transition (from the common ancestors of 
chimpanzees and men to australopithecines) was probably a dominance shift due to 
larger groups (cf. Dunbar, 1996) and to stronger social connectivity in groups.5 Moreo-
ver the loss of fur which was probably due to an adaptation to long range running dur-
ing day time under the sun, reduced the functionality of grooming. This development 
began already some 4 my BP. Phonic communication was more time-economic and 
phonic contact with socio-emotional content largely replaced bodily contact. This shift 
of dominance, which had to cross a point of symmetry, is described in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The dominance shift made social phonic communication the central technique of social 
control and management. 
                                                             
4 In “harmony theory” the heating and freezing of a dynamical system are considered as generalized 
features in a decision process (cf. Smolensky, 1986: 236f.) 
5 The absolute size of groups is perhaps not the key (the controversy about the size of hominid groups 
could impair Dunbar’s theses). Thus very large groups of animals may move together and thus fulfil 
the condition of a “large group”; what counts is the degree of interdependence and reliance on one 
another. The network should be larger than that of couples, relatives or close “friends” in chimpan-
zees. 
Bodily contact  
(e.g. grooming“) 
Phonic contact com-
munication (calls) 
Phonic (social) communication 
(including vocal imitation and 
learning) 
4 my BP 
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2.2. The expansion of referential signs in the phonic mode 
Studies of the behavior of apes in the wilderness have shown that some species have 
a simple system of calls with referential function. The calls may allow the other apes to 
distinguish a danger stemming from animals like eagles (attacking from above), carni-
vores (e.g., lions attacking on the ground), and snakes (creeping in the trees).6 Parallel 
to this simple system, bodily motions, gestures and gaze-directions give communicative 
cues, which allow for a spatial interpretation and can thus be elaborated to a “language” 
of body postures and gestures. The rich system of gestural signals was, therefore, func-
tionally parallel to a poorer system of calls. If we take the gestures of the hand, it is clear 
that as soon as hands are fully occupied with other functions like carrying tools and 
objects, or if communication takes place in the dark or at a distance (with obstacles 
between), the gestural “language” is ineffective. As such circumstances probably prevail-
ed in the ecology of the australopithecines that lived in the savannah and as the ear had 
to increase its capacity of discrimination due to the permanent danger of carnivores in 
the environment,7 the bimodality between reference by gesture and reference by phonic 
articulation shifted towards the latter. Figure 3 illustrates this transition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The dominance shift from gestural to phonic in referential communication. 
The result of this functional evolution lies midway between biological and cultural 
evolution insofar as the repertoire of manual behavior in grooming and gestures and 
                                                             
6 Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2010: 31) argue that the calls lack intentionality and that the animals 
(vervet and rhesus monkeys) are only able to extract information from the acoustic signals. As we 
cannot interview monkeys, the question of intentionality must remain open. It would, however, be 
sufficient if a cooperative practice was genetically prepared and quickly developed in these species. 
Brain scanning results show that learning does not presuppose consciousness, thus even very low 
levels of consciousness in hominids would not preclude social learning of signs and their meaning; cf. 
Duss and Henke (2011). 
7 Cf. Calvin and Bickerton (2000: 111). 
Gestural communication 
(referential function) 
Phonic communication 
(referential and social 
function) 
Phonic (referential and 
social) protolanguage 
2 my BP 
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the repertoire of social and referential calls has to be imitated and learned. However, it 
could together with the evolving tool-use have fastened the growth of the brain, i.e., the 
selection for bigger brains, which is already a general evolutionary strategy of all species 
of the lineage. Relatively to higher apes, the resulting protolanguage probably contained 
a rather large “lexicon” of social and referential calls (e.g. about 30 to 50 patterns), with 
different types of evaluative modulations (social calls) and categorical distinctions (refe-
rential calls). This led to a referentially motivated sign-architecture. The fact that chil-
dren very often show a vocabulary sprint may point to an innate capacity which given 
the proper social environment (e.g. a mother who answers questions and gives names) 
expands and enriches without difficulties the primitive lexicon after the first year by ten 
to twenty items a day, a rate other hominids would not achieve in their lifes.  
2.3. The creation of cultures  
It is clear that the capacity of imitation of phonic material, of quick and stable me-
mory entries and corresponding search procedures and semantic net-building faculties 
presuppose a basically better organized brain (cortex, centers of auditory and visual 
detection) and enough space (synaptic connectivity) to build a memory which associa-
tes phonic patterns with other (visual, olfactory etc. ) cues. This leads us to a third bi-
furcation. It concerns imitation and learning in the case of motor behavior and symbol 
use. The base-line is defined by the presence of mirror neurons in higher primates and 
their capability of quick motor learning and motor control (cf. Rizzolatti and Arbib, 
1998) and the rise of a theory of mind in late hominid (e.g. chimpanzees). We assume 
that this base-line was already reached before the lineages of chimpanzees and humans 
diverged (6-7 my BP). The bifurcation occurs between simple emulation and first “cul-
tures” of tool use in chimpanzees (cf. Boesch and Tomasello, 1998) which is still linked 
to immediate success (reward) and a more general strategy of imitation and learning, 
which allows the acquisition of know-how and even symbolic knowledge from others 
without any immediate pragmatic support (or “grounding”; cf. Cangelosi, Greco and 
Harnad 2002). In computer simulations this distinction is called “toil” versus “theft” 
strategy. In the case of symbolic learning a label is either learned in relation to its refe-
rent via trial and error or “stolen” from the symbolic behavior of others (the semantics 
are filled in later). Human infants are systematically “symbolic thieves” in the sense of 
these experiments. Human cultures accumulate information which can be transmitted 
without being applied and tested extensively by every single user. Dawkins called this 
information “memes”; cf. Blackmore (1999). 
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Figure 4: The bifurcation which separates simple cultures based on emulation and “meme”-cultures. 
The proto-species Homo erectus lived between 2my BP and 15.000 y BP (Homo flo-
rensis recently discovered) and developed a large variety of subtypes which were still 
able to interbreed if they met. In the late subspecies which had developed on the basis of 
the Homo heidelbergensis (or Homo antecessor in Spain), a phonic protolanguage that 
integrated social and referential communication and was able to receive and transmit 
the accumulated cultural knowledge must have reached a first plateau, which was suffi-
cient for the survival of this new species8 and allowed its migration into Eurasia and its 
diffusion in Africa (Homo erectus and Homo ergaster).  
 
Figure 5: Skull of Homo heidelbergensis (cranial volume 1100-1400; ca 500.000 y BP). 
Although we know nothing about the communication in these populations, the 
principle of continuity (on which Darwin founded his theses) makes us postulate a 
protolanguage, i.e. a way of phonic communication which prefigures the language typi-
cal for our species. It could correspond to the one and two word utterances of children 
in their early second year of language acquisition (this implies a mild hypothesis of 
biogenetic recapitulation) or to very rudimentary pidgins (this implies the capacity of 
communicative regression). 
                                                             
8 Recently artefacts also produced by Homo sapiens were found on the Arabian peninsula (but no 
bones). They were dated 127.000 y BP respectively 95.000 y BP. The relation to other out-of-Africa 
populations is still unclear. It seems possible that different sub-populations had left Africa in different 
periods, some of which were isolated and died out due to climatic changes. Cf. Petraglia (2011). 
Emulation of behaviour, helped 
by trial and error 
( “toil” strategy) 
Imitation and learning (“theft” 
strategy) 
The creation of cultures 
by the accumulation of 
learned behaviour 
(“meme”-cultures) 
400.000 y BP 
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3. Prelinguistic schematizations at the level of Homo erectus 
The technical evolution since the pebble culture (2,5 - 1,7 my BP in the Oldowan 
choppers) had brought about a degree of manual skill and of collective tool production 
which presupposed complex neural programs for the planning and strategic-intentional 
processing of tools and materials treated with these tools (from chase and butchering to 
the shaping of clothes and huts/houses). In this evolution of technical intelligence and 
its social management, rather complex dynamic and causal schemata had to be cognitive-
ly mastered. Figure 6 visualizes several such schemata (cf. for the foundation in catas-
trophe theory, Wildgen, 1982, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Basic schemata of action cognized in a society with “tool-culture”. 
The precise shaping of a tool out of a stone kernel asks for the strategically planed 
excision of material. The excised piece is mostly an intermediate stage of the planned 
tool, such that after a long series of strokes the final shape is reached. Whereas in Figure 
6 one has maximally two or three centers (valence 2 or 3), the excision schema asks for 
four centers (attractors) of the dynamics, Figure 7 as shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The excision schema (cf. Thom, 1983: 206). 
Schema of prehension (left) and 
emission (right) of an object 
Schema of instrumental action on 
an object (changes in the object 
are not represented) 
Instrument 
Object 
Agent 
Object 
Agent 
Excision: negative part 
Instrument of excision 
Remaining object: positive part 
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In Figure 8 the transition from simple excision in the case of Oldowan choppers to 
the manufacturing of the refined handaxe by Homo heidelbergensis is shown. The latter 
asks for at last 20 to 30 subprocesses as experimental archeologists could demonstrate. 
   
Figure 8: Oldowan choppers from Harar, Ethiopia, ca. 1,7 my and refined hand axe used by Homo 
heidelbergensis (Acheulian industry). 
Another important cultural schema was that of exchange (materials for tools, rare 
objects for decoration and art, women for extra-tribal marriage). The basic exchange 
schema consisted of mutual giving and receiving and its formal schema corresponds to 
that in Figure 6 above, where the role of the instrument is replaced by the exchanged 
objects given and taken by two agents (the permanent states on top and at the bottom). 
The question of a fourth force, a value-measure as tertium comparationis of exchange 
may be asked in this context. This means, if object A is given and object B is received in 
exchange, do they have equivalent values? This problem is actually solved via the mone-
tary value of objects but originally one has to presuppose some evaluative scale based on 
cultural conventions. By its conventionality it functions like a code. i.e. a symbolic form 
not visible but responsible for successful exchange. In catastrophe theory one can use 
the two-dimensional singularity derived from higher catastrophes (cf. Wildgen, 1982: 
62-78 for the mathematical derivation of this schema and Idem, 1994: 129-134 for an 
advanced interpretation). With the cultural introduction of specific exchange goods 
(shells, gold, silver, then paper money and bank transfers) this symbolic medium first 
became touchable (e.g. coins), later it was successively replaced by a procedural techni-
que in a complicated system of banking. In any case the quasi-physical process under-
lying the use of instruments or the simple exchange is completed by the emergence of a 
symbolic code which is functionally linked to the quasi-physical processes (enables and 
controls them). Now, if the proto-cognition and proto-technique of Homo erec-
tus/ergaster and his/her descendants Homo heidelbergensis, Homo neanderthalensis 
and Homo sapiens had to cope with schemata of this complexity, it had also to organize 
this complexity in a phonic structure for instruction, report and narrative as a precon-
dition for cultural accumulation of the corresponding competences. A major difference 
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between Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens concerns the importance of social 
life (mutual aid and altruism beyond kinship) and as a consequence long range cultural 
and biological exchange. This may be one of the reasons why Homo sapiens survived 
the severe ice age period between 30.000 and 13.000 and Homo neanderthalensis did 
not.9 
4. Events, actions and time in a protolanguage 
Another source-domain of human language is linked to spatial cognition, which 
may be considered as a kind of  “fossil”  of protolanguage in modern languages. As 
Bickerton (2010) suggests, there are two socially organized animals with communicative 
skills related to space beyond the situation in which interaction occurs: bees and ants, 
which “transfer information to nest-mates about food sources” (cf. ibidem: 206f. and 
Wildgen, 2004: 45f.). In the case of humans around 2 my BP, they had to recruit as ma-
ny companions and as quickly as possible in order to exploit the carcass of a megafauna 
in competition with other scavengers. Having even simple iconic and indexical signa-
ling techniques they could solve this problem and survive. The selective pressure on this 
social behavior made spatial orientation by language a central feature in the evolution of 
language (or some protolangague).The cognitive organization of the ambient world can 
be deictically structured as here (I), there (you, objects), and by different steps of dist-
ance: near, far off, and midway. Many languages, e.g., the Hopi-language analyzed by 
Whorf and later reassessed by Malotki (1979) show a very rich system of categories 
realized by suffixes (of case) and by pronouns. The basic dimensions of such a system of 
orientation are: 
 The human body (the self) with head (above), feet (below), hands (right and left), 
face (front), and back (behind); major ego-centric distances: proximate to the 
trunk (face), in the reach of the hands (of grasping), at a speaking or a sight 
distance. 
                                                             
9 There was probably some mixture after 60.000 BC, as 1% to 4% of Neanderthal and Sapiens genomes 
in out-of Africa populations match closely (beyond the common heritage shared with chimpanzees); 
cf. Green et alii (2010). The maturation of the brain and the corresponding periods before adulthood 
were shorter in Homo neanderthalensis, such that only less complex cultural skills could be learned; 
cf.Gunz et alii (2010). Moreover Homo sapiens may have acquired in the critical period, when small 
population survived in South Africa in caves (e.g. those near the Pinnacle point, cf. Marean, 2010) the 
technique of fishing and a diet less dependent on meat. The degree of altruism and social cognition in 
humans may also have differentiated both populations; its genetic conditions are analyzed in Reuter et 
alii (2010). 
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 The landscape and the sky with its orientation: sunrise, sunset, sun (moon, stars), 
directions of winds (if stable), etc.; distances are those of the skyline, neighboring 
locations, centre and periphery of the village, etc. 
The spatial categorizations, which in the second case depend on the ambient (cultu-
ral) ecology, can be translated into gestures and phonetically uttered distinctions. In 
many languages pre- and postposition, locative cases, verbal affixes contain a closed set 
of such distinctions. Together with the basic action schemata they make up the (seman-
tic) core of phrasal and sentential syntax that will evolve based on these foundations. 
One can distinguish two sub-aspects: processes in space, such as spatial orientation 
and navigation, and temporal classifications and rhythmical patterns. 
4.1. Spatial schemata 
The representation of space has to do with frontiers (their transition) and perspecti-
ves. A first perspective is centrifugal, i.e., starting from the self and its basic bodily mo-
tions an experienced three dimensional space is cognized: in front of – behind (go), 
above – below (climb, fall), left – right (grasp with the left hand or the right hand). This 
space of bodily motion with feet and arms defines the immediate space, where objects 
may be approached, reached and manipulated. The intermediate space depends on 
man’s ecology; it can be the housing (the cave, abri) or the village; the distal space con-
tains roughly all possible itineraries (of hunting/gathering). The second perspective is 
centripetal, i.e., the self is seen as the place of effects triggered by external causes. The 
sky, the horizon (typical points where the sun sets or rises), the favored direction of 
winds, the ridge of mountains may be the external locus of orientation for the self, who 
is at the center of a force field or gradient implicit in these delimitations. Many myths 
and religions refer to this extreme locus of orientation as they interpret the fate of 
humans as standing under the control of such distant (and often invisible) forces.10 In 
Figure 9 the topology and dynamics of such a cognized space are illustrated. 
 
 
                                                             
10 The dependence of religion on models of the universe became evident in the processes of the catho-
lic church against Bruno and Galilee. Although astral deities (the sun, the moon, Venus, etc.) had no 
explicit function in the Bible and the New Testament, a change in the cosmological world view was 
understood as a aggression against the foundations of the Christian faith. This shows the continuity of 
space dependent myths (cf. Wildgen 1998: for the case of Bruno). 
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             Figure 9: Force fields of centrifugal versus centripetal orientation. 
The cognizing of such schemata for orientation may only show up in behavior (as it 
does in many animals), it may be gestured or it can be deictically organized in a phonic 
language (cf. Levinson, 2001: 317 ff.). For the Homo erectus the cognized space seems 
clear. The inner space is defined by the use of hands and instruments, the medium spa-
ce by the choice or construction of dwelling-places (to which the group could return). 
The centrifugal organization is involved in long-range excursions and migration. As the 
orientation system cannot be genetically coded it has to be learnt, adapted to changing 
contexts and socially shared. Language is one possible solution to this problem, be it 
gestural (behavioral) or phonic and as humans have chosen the path of phonation it is 
plausible that our ancestors began to proceed further into this direction (cf. Figure 2). 
4.2. Temporal schemata 
The representation of time is rooted in the classification of multimodal sensory in-
puts using specific temporal rhythms (clocks). Pöppel (1997, 2010) proposed two tem-
poral windows for multimodal integration: 
 The window of 30 msec. Only after a stability of 30 msec does an event become 
an object of (multimodal) perception; it can be classified, labeled, compared, i.e., 
further processed. 
Centripetal cognized space Centrifugal cognized space 
Self Self 
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 The window of 3 sec. A sequence of events can be understood as a structure. In 
this window the smaller units (30 msec) are correlated as: before – after, cause – 
effect, etc. This is the point where a notion of structured temporality is born. 
In a similar vein (but without reference to neurobiology) Bickerton (2000: 275) 
mentions the „higher level signal coherence“ as a precondition for hierarchical structur-
ing and tries to explain the "catastrophic“ transition to syntax along this line. A proto-
language must categorize events and actions (by proto-verbs) and must discriminate 
stable entities (by proto-nouns). The question arises as to whether temporal, dynamic, 
quantitative, qualitative relations between them can be mastered and if so, to what de-
gree. This question brings us to the two basic delimitations of a protolanguage discus-
sed by Bickerton: phrase structure (X-bar-structures) and government (argument clus-
ters). These conditions may include the use of recursive rules in the neural “machinery” 
(Chomsky’s metaphor) retrieving and producing language, but this link is controversial; 
cf. Fitch (2010). I will argue in the next pages that there are intrinsic complexity barriers 
which could have blocked the further elaboration of a protolanguage for a long (evolu-
tionary) time-span (cf. Wildgen 2004: Chapter 8 for a fuller treatment). 
In order to have access to a complexity measure I shall introduce a model of event-
schemata. One can take grasping (with the hand) as the basic scenario. The action-
concept GRASP involves two stable entities: the body (the hand) and the object. Every 
point on the lines in Figure 7 is an attractor, i.e., the perception of a stable entity in the 
30 msec window (cf. above). The whole schema should fit into the 3 sec window, e.g., in 
the sentence: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Process (catastrophe) schema of GRASP. 
The hand axe 
The father 
Completion of the grasping process 
The father (having the 
hand axe) 
The father    took      the hand axe     (from the floor) 
A B 
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Early humans (e.g., Homo habilis) already had a hand with the opposition of thumb 
and fingers, but some features are still linked to climbing (as in gorillas and chimpan-
zees). The Homo erectus had a hand which was adapted to strong grasping (as places on 
the bones, where muscles are attached, show, cf. Piveteau, 1991: 74 f.). One may distin-
guish three ways of grasping: 
 the force grip (e.g., of a branch) 
 the precision grip (e.g., of a small tool)11 
 the refined grip (e.g., of a needle)12  
The refinement refers to the topology of the capture. These distinctions which have 
a long evolutionary history constitute a kind of manner specification in relation to the 
schema in Figure 7. As the distinction between several types of grips shows, more elabo-
ration appears as soon as more precise manipulations on objects and instruments are 
developed. The fact that a cognitive bivalent schema and a manner component can be 
cognized does not necessarily mean that it could be transformed into phonic signals. If 
we assume a frequent vocalization (inferred from the evolution of the sub-laryngeal 
tract; cf. Lieberman, 1989) and a steady increase of memory (due to the growth of the 
brain) linked to an advance in social cognition (cf. Dunbar, 1996) it becomes clear that 
this cognitive schema and subsequent ones are a preadaptation for the evolution of 
verbal phrases or valence patterns in sentences. Thus, in order to verbally represent 
important and recurrent actions in a protolanguage the cognitive schema of grasping 
could be used as a kind of ground for iconic/metaphorical transfer to all kinds of mani-
pulations on objects. As soon as instruments were used this schema could be iterated. 
 The father (A) takes a hand axe (B) to move/change/kill ... object (C). 
 The father (A) takes a stone/bone (B1) to hit/shape the pebble (B2) which should 
later kill the animal (C). 
The schema of grasping assembles causal/enabling/intentional meaning compo-
nents, which are necessarily present in the purposeful shaping of a tool and it also lays 
the groundwork for force-dynamics (cf. Talmy, 1988) in human language. In this deve-
lopment a first barrier of complexity appears. While the schemata shown in Figure 6 are 
                                                             
11 In the evolution of pongids the origin of the precision grip seems to be a critical transition which 
allowed “grasping predation of certain species of insects at the terminal ends of bushes and shrubs” 
and this “opened a niche for primate evolution” (Quiatt and Reynolds, 1993: 123). It had as conse-
quence the “conversion of active behavior to crepuscular and diurnal phrases of activity“ (ibidem). 
12 Cf. Piveteau, 1991: 29, who calls it: “préhension de délicatesse”. 
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dynamically and topologically simple, the composition of such schemata needs specific 
restrictions to guarantee stability for such a composition.13 
A second restriction concerns the manner component. The evolutionary old distinc-
tions between forms of grip and manners of locomotion (related to the dynamics of the 
legs; e.g. go, run, jump, climb etc.) are topologically basic and could belong to the basic 
constituents of a protolanguage. 
A set of rather abstract specifications which are often grouped together in Pidgin 
and Creole languages can be called the TMA-complex (T = Time, M = Mode, A = As-
pect). They are the next step which could have “evolved” after the protolanguage. The 
evolutionary period associated with these developments is probably linked to the final 
speciation of Homo sapiens between 200.000 and 100.000 y. BP. The order of emer-
gence of grammatical features could have been: 
 elaboration of valence patterns (up to valence 3 or even 4) 
 elaboration of the manner component 
 elaboration of the TMA-component 
I have started from the grasp schema, but there are simpler schemata. The dynami-
cally simplest schema is that of stable existence. If we apply the 3 sec-window, any entity 
not changing in this window is a candidate. As the inputs of classification or labeling-
reaction are not only spatio-temporal events but also qualities, one can assume the slow 
increase of quasi nominal/adjectival labels as soon as memory capacities enabled it and 
social demands asked for it. One could imagine that labels for other people, animals, 
plants, and artefacts were the first candidates for a growing lexicon. This development is 
also the natural continuation of classificatory capabilities of other mammals (even birds 
and fishes) and the differentiated warning calls of specific apes14. The cries of alarm, 
disturbance and food constitute a basic lexicon with reference to specific situations and 
they have distinctive pragmatic values, e.g., as asking for, responding to, informing 
about, etc. 
                                                             
13 The elementary catastrophes on which the schemata are based are local evolutions, i.e. in the 
neighbourhood of a point (the singularity). In the case of composition one enters the domain of global 
analysis which goes beyond catastrophe theory. One has to integrate the local fields to a global map 
using techniques of gluing together or overlapping, as if a set of snapshot is used to build an overall 
image.  
14 Cf. Fischer and Hammerschmidt (2001) for a critical discussion and experiments with Barbary 
macaques. 
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5. The transition to full-fletched languages: a first sketch 
The increase of the lexicon and the availability of case-frames (action – schemata) 
and spatial categorizations establish the source-domain, in which a very complex sys-
tem of grammar could emerge by self-organization. The compositionality of human 
languages is the result of such a self-organization as Kirby (2000) showed by computer 
simulations. In this process less general (idiomatic) rules give way to more general rules 
through learning and in the transmission sequence between users (cf. Hurford, 2000). 
The basic capacity for the production and understanding of a rapid sequence of phonic 
events is primarily due to short- and long-term phonetic memory. Studdert-Kennedy 
(2000: 17) says: “Without a pre-adapted system for storing phonetic structure indepen-
dently from its meaning, syntax could not have begun to evolve.” The basic syntactic 
capacities of man are better demonstrated by morphological and phrase compositional-
ity than by sentential syntax (word order, movements, trace, etc.). The basic capacity is 
“a way of systematizing existing vocabulary items and being able to create new ones”, 
rather than some “fancy recursive generativity of syntax” (Jackendoff, 2002: 244).15 This 
is also demonstrated by the extreme diversity of syntactic devices in the languages of the 
world and the impact of historically recent (cultural) evolutions on features like domi-
nant word order. 
The valence patterns found in verbs (basic sentences) and nouns/adjectives (basic 
noun phrases) could be the results of a fourth bifurcation which has split the holophrases 
of a protolanguage into different functional subparts.16 As the holophrase (compare the 
                                                             
15 If recursion means that an open field of possible utterances which are either referentially very global 
or very precise is enabled, as Fitch (2010) concludes after a thorough analysis of a set of definitions for 
recursion and the criteria which allow us to say that a behaviour follows an underlying recursive process, 
then one may accept this as a description of a question to be solved by an  evolutionary theory of  
language. 
16 The question at what date this change showed up is part of a controversy. Some authors believe that 
only the rich symbolic products demonstrated by cave painters (after 35.000 y BP) can be considered 
as evidence for the existence of “homo symbolicus” (Cassirer). This means that only at a stage when 
Cro Magnon man entered Europe and replaced slowly the Homo neanderthalensis who had occupied 
this region for almost 200.000 y the human capacity for symbolic thinking and symbolic language was 
there. In this case Homo sapiens originated in Eastern Africa, living parallel to Homo neanderthalensis 
in the Near East (Palestine) for almost 50.000 y and after his expansion to southern Asia and Australia 
had acquired this capacity on his return to Europe (and Africa). This hypothesis is, however, incom-
patible with the acceptance that all present humans have the same (inborn) language capacity. One 
could argue that the species which was biologically shaped in East Africa around 200.000 y BP had the 
latent (biologically present but behaviourally uncovered) faculty of language. This dormant faculty 
finally surfaced some 50.000 y ago under specific environmental conditions or it was just discovered 
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holophrastic units of child speech) is split up into two (or three) constituents, a “memo-
ry” of its unity is left; in Tesnière (1959: 11) it is called “connexion”, an invisible link 
between separated parts of the sentence. The intuition about such a dynamical split is 
very old. In Wildgen (2002a, b) the Platonic theory of predication has been shown to 
underlie this idea. It seems that there exists an intuitive (silent) knowledge accessible to 
reflection about the evolutionary bifurcation and the force field it created in basic sen-
tences. The bifurcation goes, however, in the opposite sense compared to the bifurca-
tions mentioned before. It does not eliminate or reduce a former opposition but creates 
new oppositions and these are the germs for further structural bifurcations responsible 
for the dynamic complexity of human languages. The splitting of holophrastic units has 
two effects. On one hand the dynamic tension between the two different parts remains 
active and drives the dynamics of sentence formation/understanding; on the other hand 
new levels of complexity replace the holophastic gestalt; these are conversational turns, 
islands of monologue in the conversational dynamics, such as narratives, descriptions 
or argument sequences. They will be discussed in the next section. Figure 11 illustrates 
the basic split and the dynamic configuration it has created. This evolutionary step was 
decisive for the emergence of the complete language capacity in Homo sapiens in his 
pre-out-of-Africa stage (ca. 100.000 to 60.000 y BP). Cf. also Wildgen (2009) for biolin-
guistic aspects of grammar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: (Productive) Bifurcation and the emergent dynamic field (valence). 
                                                                                                                                                           
by some individuals and groups. In this case, language would not be a biologically (genetically) fixed 
faculty but a cultural innovation which rapidly spread after 50.000 in the community of Cro Magnon 
man. The Homo neanderthalensis was for some reason or other not able to adopt this cultural innova-
tion and died out. In a certain sense this would close the domain: evolution of language and go back to 
hypothetical constructions in the 18th century: How did (single) humans discover the possibility of 
using language efficiently (cf. Herder and others; the most prominent anthropologist arguing for such 
a late origin of human language is Tattersall; cf. Tattersall, 2010). 
First constituent: some protosubject, or a 
configuration of semantic roles 
Second constituent: some protopredicate 
Holophrastic unit Dynamic field linking the bifurcating 
poles: “connexion”/valence 
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The basic question is: How can such a tension between the simultaneously specified 
poles of subject (thema) and predicate (rheme) not only be conserved but also used for 
a growing lexicon of constructions (cf. Wildgen, 2008: chapter 6 for “construction 
grammars”)? It probably concerns at the same time the massive ambiguity of syntactic 
constructions and lexical items used in their frame. Theoretically most sentences are 
multiply ambiguous, but normal speaker are almost not concerned by the effect of this 
ambiguities. The answers to such questions and challenges will probably come from 
neurosemantics, a field beyond our concern in this article. 
6. Further steps of complexification 
Sentential patterns may be very simple even in human languages, e.g. in pidgins, in 
learner languages and even in normal languages with a broad usage (e.g. the so-called 
minimal languages analyzed by Gil 2009). Human utterances are, however, not restricted 
to isolated sentences. To the contrary, the natural units are sequences of sentences, so 
called turns in conversation, adjacent pairs as in: question-answer and rather often 
monologue sequences as in narratives, descriptions and arguments. Recurrent patterns 
may be due to ritual behavior; rule governed sequences in relation to major functions 
occur in fairy tales, jokes and songs. The every day myths commented by Barthes (1957) 
and political rhetoric in general demonstrate the ongoing relevance of ritualized symbo-
lic behavior. In terms of Peirce’s classification of signs the textual domain belongs to the 
sign level of argument (the two others are rhematic sign and dicent sign). The argument 
exemplified by a syllogism consisting of three propositions is based on logical coherence 
(consequence, deduction). In the case of the narrative the coherence is rather a tempo-
ral and a causal (motivational) one. In the case of a descriptive text (in a tourist guide or 
in the oral description of a route to follow to reach a specific place) the coherence is 
spatial and temporal. A similar “coherence” of sequential actions is asked for in tool 
manufacturing, where up to 30 steps have to be followed to produce a perfect hand axe 
out of a piece of flint-stone. Thus the capability to control far reaching coherence pat-
terns in action (and later in words) is surely a central feature which distinguishes the 
language of our species from a protolanguage. The question if recurrent actions embed-
ded into a holistic gestalt (manufacturing the hand axe) apply some recursive rule is as 
open as the question if human utterances use such recursive rules (the fact that a model 
reproducing human sentences can use such rules is not decisive insofar as the same 
sentences can also be produced by some non-finite state program without recursive 
rules; cf. Fitch, 2010). 
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A more fundamental problem concerns the level of language to which a selective 
process could apply. As this is normally the phenomenal level of holistic behavior, we 
presume that the textual behavior is the proper level on which selection effects play a 
role. Therefore human evolution must have selected for the effective use of language in 
social communication and not at the level of sentences or words. These levels are only 
selection relevant insofar as they allow the construction of coherence in narratives, 
description or arguments. This line of research must be extended instead of the misuse 
of evolutionary arguments to foster the position of paradigms established in mid of the 
last century, such as the Chomskyan one. 
7. Conclusions 
The biological evolution of human language is basically a continuous process in 
which the bodily preconditions were provided. In the further social evolution that star-
ted with the increase of group size (or group organization) and new forms of symbolica-
lly ruled social behavior three bifurcations with symmetry-breaking and convergence 
occurred: from manual to phonic contact management, from gestural to phonic deixis 
and referential location and from context dependent emulation to cultural learning. 
After these dramatic shifts towards a complex phonic system of communication with 
socio-emotional and referential function, and cultures based on symbolic transmission, 
the centrality of language for human survival and expansion was firmly established. 
Language capacity became a species-defining character of humans (and had dramatic 
selection consequences). The migration of the Homo erectus to Europe and Asia and its 
survival for almost 2 my demonstrated this selective advantage at the level of the proto-
language. 
The next stage had to cross a barrier of complexity linked to multi-valued valence 
patterns. The stone-age industries and the communicational consequences of it, prehis-
toric art and myths, show that this barrier had been crossed when Homo sapiens began 
to migrate out of Africa (between 100.000 and 70.000 y BP); cf. Wildgen 2004: Chapter 
4 and 5 for a treatment of stone age techniques and Paleolithic art. 
The major effects on language were: 
 a larger and steadily growing lexicon; 
 the mastery of rapid and complex strings of phonic signals and corresponding 
functional-semantic patterns as shown in lexical innovation, composition, 
grammaticalization, and complex phrasal syntax; 
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 a new level of creativity in language and art linked to a growing complexity and 
diversity of languages. 
Finally with the rise of agriculture and the breeding of animals, metallurgy, ship 
building, towns and large civilizations in Egypt and Mesopotamia a new era of symbolic 
communication arrived which lies beyond the scope of his paper. 
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